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Abstract It has become commonplace to hold the view
that virtual surrogates for the things that are good in life are
inferior to their actual, authentic counterparts, including
virtual education, virtual skill-demanding activities and
virtual acts of creativity. Virtual friendship has also been
argued to be inferior to traditional, embodied forms of
friendship. Coupled with the view that virtual friendships
threaten to replace actual ones, the conclusion is often
made that we ought to concentrate our efforts on actual
friendships rather than settle for virtual replacements. The
purpose of this paper is to offer a balanced and empirically
grounded analysis of the relative prudential value of actual
and virtual friendship. That is, do actual and virtual
friendships differ when it comes to enhancing our sub-
jective well-being? In doing so, I will discuss a number of
presuppositions that lie behind common criticisms of vir-
tual friendship. This will include, among other consider-
ations, their potential for replacing actual friendship, as
well as the possibility for self-disclosure, trust, sharing and
dynamic spread of happiness in virtual worlds. The purpose
is not to arrive at a firm, normative conclusion, but rather to
introduce a number of considerations that we should take
into account in our individual deliberations over which role
virtual friendships ought to have in our unique life
situations.
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Background
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a number of
considerations relevant to the evaluation of the relative
prudential value of virtual versus actual friendship. By
‘relative prudential value’, I refer to different degrees in
which virtual and actual friendships can contribute to
‘subjective well-being’ (which I will elaborate below). By
‘virtual friendship’, I refer to friendships that are formed
and maintained (near) exclusively by means of computer-
mediated communication (CMC). To narrow the enquiry
further, I will particularly refer to CMC in the context of
virtual worlds, i.e. three-dimensional, persistent, computer-
simulated environments in which graphical representations
of the users (‘avatars’) are used for communication by
means of text as well as simulated bodily gestures and
appearances—exemplified by Second Life, World of War-
craft and Runescape. The reason I focus on these kinds of
virtual worlds is that they allow us to actually maintain a
distinction between virtual and actual, in contrast with
social networks such as Facebook, where it is often
impossible to distinguish between virtual and actual
friends. That is, friendships in virtual worlds will typically
be formed and maintained entirely within the virtual world,
in contrast with social network friendships, which are often
formed and maintained also outside the social network. The
question I will investigate, then, is whether friendships
formed and maintained in virtual worlds (‘virtual friend-
ship’) are less conducive to subjective well-being than
traditional forms of non-mediated friendship (‘actual
friendship’).
By way of background, I will first clarify what I refer to
as the prudential value of friendship and explain how this is
related to ethics. I will then introduce a number of common
claims that have been made about the prudential value of
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virtual friendship. As I will argue, these kinds of claims
presuppose a number of controversial background
assumptions, and I will discuss one of the most important
ones: whether virtual friendships actually tend to replace
actual ones or not.1On the background of all this, I will
then move on to a comparison between the prudential value
of virtual and actual friendship, taking both philosophical
and empirical considerations into account. The ultimate
purpose is not to arrive at a firm, normative conclusion, but
rather to have introduced a number of important consid-
erations that should be taken into account when consider-
ing the role virtual friendships ought to have in our
individual lives, as determined by our unique opportunities
and capabilities.
The role of subjective well-being in ethics
Although rarely made explicit, most criticisms of virtual
friendships amount to a criticism of their conduciveness to
happiness. Friendship is typically regarded as having
intrinsic value, and not something we desire as amere
means to an end. Indeed, having a ‘‘friend’ merely as a
means to an end might be seen as a contradiction in terms.
That said, a fundamental reason why we go to such lengths
to gain and maintain friendship is because they make us
happy. Thus, when asking whether we ought to choose one
type of friendship over another, one (but by no means the
only) fundamental consideration is whether actual friend-
ships are more conducive to well-being than virtual
friendships. There are certainly other relevant consider-
ations. A purely philosophical approach would be to ana-
lyze what is meant by ‘friendship’, whether there are
necessary or sufficient conditions for something to count as
a friend, as well as considerations of how friendship is
related to a meaningful or virtuous life. My limited purpose
in this paper is to discuss whether the differences between
virtual and actual friendships correspond to a difference in
their ability to make us happy. This is what I will refer to as
their relative prudential value. As Tiberius makes clear,
prudential value refers to ‘‘goods for a person, as opposed
to moral or aesthetic values’’ (Tiberius 2006, p. 494).
Rephrasing the question posed in this paper in its simplest
form, then: Are virtual friends less good for us than actual
friends; do they make us less happy? As critics have
pointed out to me in the past, it is not immediately clear
what this has to do with ethics so a few words of clarifi-
cation are in order.2
At the most basic level, a notion of what makes us happy
is necessary for any ethical theory that is grounded in some
form of hedonism. For instance, Mill’s famous ‘greatest
happiness principle’ ‘‘holds that actions are right in pro-
portion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they
tend to produce the reverse of happiness’’(Mill 1863,
pp. 9–10). Clearly, as Mill himself insisted, such a theory
would differ enormously depending on what we actually
mean by happiness, but in most forms of utilitarianism the
happiness in question is something that is experienced,
hence at least partly subjective, rather than consisting of an
a priori conception of what happiness is. Thus, if we ask
the question of whether we ought to choose actual friend-
ship over virtual friendship, a utilitarian analysis would
have to ask the question whether there is a difference in
their tendency to promote happiness.
It is quite common to criticize this kind of utilitarianism
for not distinguishing between different types of pleasures,
without which we would supposedly have to admit that a
life of easily accessible and artificially produced pleasures
is as good as a life of hard-earned, authentic pleasures.3
Indeed, this seems to be the general concern that lies
behind criticism of virtual friendship; that they are some-
how inauthentic hence not the kind that will provide us
with genuine happiness. Although I have argued elsewhere
that happiness should be regarded as a subjective mental
state (Søraker 2010b), my more modest claim for this paper
is that it is often essential to understand how something
affects our subjective mental state of well-being if we want
to investigate whether we ought to do something or not. It
is important to note that this does not entail that we should
always do whatever it is that we believe will make us
happy. There will often be ethical reasons why we should
not do something even if it contributes to happiness.
Indeed, another reason why considerations of happiness are
important to ethics comes from the fact that ethical
dilemmas often boil down to a choice between self-interest
and other-interest. Some of the most ethically challenging
situations we find ourselves in—on a regular basis—con-
sists in having to choose between my own happiness and
that of others; I want to do x because x makes me happy,
but I should do y instead because y makes others happy. In
order to make an informed choice in these situations, it is
important to know whether, or to what degree, something
actually will make me and/or others happier. If I sacrifice
the well-being of others for a slight or even illusory
1 I discuss a number of other such presuppositions in Søraker (2010b,
pp. 79–90).
2 Unfortunately, there is not enough room for a full description and
defence of this approach in this paper. For readers interested in (and/
Footnote 2 continued
or sceptical of) the relation between subjective well-being and ethics,
I refer to Søraker (2010b) and my forthcoming work on the tentatively
entitled ‘‘prudential-empirical ethics of technology’.
3 The ‘experience machine’ (Nozick 1993) and ‘deceived business-
man’ (Kagan 1998) are some of the thought experiments intended to
show the importance of authentic happiness.
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increase in my own happiness, this would in many cases be
unethical. Similarly, whether or not it is ethically justified
not to sacrifice my own well-being for the sake of others
will crucially depend on whether x will substantially
increase my well-being. Thus, the degree in which some-
thing tends to increase subjective well-being is essential for
any utilitarian consideration.
It is also worth mentioning that considerations of sub-
jective well-being by no means excludes more deontological
considerations. It may very well be the case that something
increases my happiness yet I am not allowed to do it. There
are, for instance, many ways in which we can use someone
else as mere means for our own happiness, and in such cases
it is pointless to ask how happy something will make me. In
other words, subjective well-being is only a relevant con-
sideration when we are speaking of morally permissible
actions, but this is often where we find ourselves. Very few
would be prepared to say that virtual friendships are morally
impermissible, and this is exactly why it is important to ask to
what degree, if at all, our subjective well-being will be
affected by replacing one with the other.
It is also essential to pay more attention to issues of
well-being in ethics of technology since many (if not most)
technologies have a profound effect on our well-being
regardless of whether there is any wrongdoing involved.
For instance, it is difficult to point fingers and speak of
‘wrong-doing’ when it comes to the invention of the tele-
vision, yet there is no doubt that the television has affected
our lives tremendously. Thus, if we are serious about
wanting to evaluate and predict the intended and unin-
tended effects of a given technology, we need to also
consider its impact on subjective well-being—especially
when the technology in question threatens to replace pre-
viously non-technological experiences and activities.
On this background I will proceed to discuss the dif-
ference between actual and virtual friendships when it
comes to their impact on well-being—as one among more
considerations that are essential for judging whether we
ought not to replace one with the other. When doing so, I
will partly ground my analysis in empirical research, in
particular the field of ‘positive psychology’, which is the
scientific study of what constitutes subjective well-being,
and how it can be enhanced. These researchers have pro-
duced a large and valuable body of research that has been
largely left untapped in applied ethics. Although one of
their consistent findings is that we have a ‘‘set point’’ which
partly determines how happy we can be, an equally con-
sistent finding is that there are numerous ‘volitional
activities’ that can bring us beyond our set-point of hap-
piness (Peterson 2006, p. 97ff). These include physical
pleasure, skill-demanding activities (‘‘flow’’), bodily
health, acts of kindness—and perhaps most importantly,
social relationships.
Empirical research does suggest that having good and
lasting friendships contributes to one’s well-being (at least,
statistically speaking). The strength of the correlations, the
consensus of meta studies (cf. Baumeister and Leary 1995;
Diener and Seligman 2002; Tiberius 2008) as well as
research showing that loss of close relationships have a
strong and lasting effect on happiness (Clark et al. 2008) all
suggest that there is a causality from the quality of our
communities and relationships, on the one hand, and well-
being, on the other. This is further suggested by Demir and
Weitekamp (2007), who found a significant correlation also
when controlling for differences in personality. In fact, the
research findings indicate that there is a bidirectional
causality between subjective well-being and the number
and quality of relationships (Diener and Biswas-Diener
2008, p. 20). On this basis, two of the most influential
positive psychology researchers, Ed Diener and Martin
Seligman, go so far as to state that ‘‘social relationships
form a necessary but not sufficient condition for high
happiness—that is, they do not guarantee high happiness,
but it does not appear to occur without them’’ (Diener and
Seligman 2002, p. 83, my emphasis).4
If it is the case that friendship is essential to well-being,
which there is little reason to doubt, the introduction of
new venues in which to pursue friendship could be seen as
something positive. These new types of friendship could
simply be seen as more opportunities for establishing
friendships. There are, however, numerous philosophers
who have claimed that they are of less value than their
actual counterparts, thus the danger is that these inferior
forms of friendship replace their superior counterparts.5
Common critiques of the prudential value of virtual
friendship
Hubert Dreyfus is one of many philosophers who has
criticized the replacement of actual communities and
friendships with virtual ones. He argues that we cannot
have the same range of movements and expressions of the
body in virtual communities, nor a sense of context,
commitment or shared risk-taking. Furthermore, the lack of
physical context fosters what he characterizes as the
nihilist, irresponsible and often uninformed nature of vir-
tual communities (Dreyfus 2004). Connecting this to the
4 See Peterson (2006, p. 261) for similarly strong claims made by
other researchers. It should be noted that, in contrast with the more
rigorous use of ‘necessary condition’ common in philosophy, Diener
and Seligman state that ‘‘for a variable to be necessary for happiness,
virtually every happy person should possess that variable’’ (Diener
and Seligman 2002, p. 81).
5 I will return to the question of whether they actually do tend to
replace online friendship below.
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existentialism of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Kierkegaard, he
further argues that the biggest problem when it comes to
virtual communities is that the lack of risk, danger, injury
and ‘‘possibility of grief and humiliation’’ (Dreyfus 2009,
p. 103) makes it impossible to make truly unconditional
commitments. In the words of Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘‘the
secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitful-
ness and the greatest enjoyment is to live dangerously!’’
(Nietzsche 1887/2007, p. 161, §283) and according to
Dreyfus, sitting in front of your computer does not subject
you to these important risks.
A number of arguments very similar to Dreyfus’ have
been put forward by other philosophers. Albert Borgmann,
on the basis of a distinction between instrumental, com-
modified and final communities, argues that virtual com-
munities can at best be instrumental or commodified,
because they do not contain ‘‘the fullness of reality, the
bodily presence of persons and the commanding presence
of things’’ found in final communities (Borgmann 2004,
p. 63). This is also reflected in Borgmann’s (1984) influ-
ential notion of focal things and practices, as something
that engages you not only with reality but also with others.
For Borgmann, the gathering of a scattered family around
the dinner table is seen as a focal practice ‘‘par excellence’’
(Borgmann 1984, p. 204).
In a similar fashion, Darin Barney (2004) sees virtual
communities as inferior due to their lack of physical
practices and Howard Rheingold argues that the lack of
spontaneous bodily gestures and facial expressions is the
reason for the ‘‘ontological untrustworthiness’’ of virtual
acts of communication (Rheingold 2000, p. 177). A related
argument has also been made by Langdon Winner, who
argues that virtual communities ought not to be regarded as
communities at all, because this ignores the importance of
‘‘obligations, responsibilities, constraints, and mounds of
sheer work that real communities involve’’(Winner 1997,
p. 17).
Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews, in one of the most
explicit philosophical criticisms of virtual surrogates as
inferior, argue that virtual friendships are inferior to actual
friendships because CMC eliminates non-voluntary self-
disclosure and enhances our ability to choose and control
how we appear to the other—which entails that virtual
friends cannot get to know each other as well as actual
friends (I will return to this towards the end of the paper).
Cocking and Matthews are also explicit about one extre-
mely important point that lies behind most criticisms of
virtual practices as inferior: ‘‘though we think internet
‘friendship’ is quite inferior to non-virtual friendship, we
do not think that it is necessarily bad in itself’’ (Cocking
and Matthews 2000, p. 224). This illustrates how the kinds
of claims outlined presuppose to varying degrees that
inferior virtual friendships will partly replace real ones.
That is, as long as virtual friendships are not seen as
intrinsically detrimental to well-being (which few would
argue), the only way in which they can be detrimental to
well-being is by replacing that which is more valuable.
Do virtual friends tend to replace actual ones?
First of all, regardless of the relative value of virtual and
actual friends, it would not be a widespread problem that
people chose virtual friends if traditional friendship was
just as easily attainable. To draw an analogy, if someone
discovers that the planet Venus is made of gold, this would
not be a threat to the value of gold on earth as long as it is
significantly more difficult to acquire. However, virtual
friendship will be easier to attain for many people, because
of lack of obstacles such as physical appearance (age,
gender, looks etc.), physical status indicators (cultural
indicators, social status etc.) and the absence of other
physical limitations such as geographical distance, physical
disabilities and so forth. This presupposition clearly shows
why this issue is so controversial, since the introduction of
a new and easier way to get friends should be hailed as
great news, if it had not been for the worry that these types
of friendships are inferior. This would still not be a prob-
lem, however, if they do not tend to replace the supposedly
superior types of friendship. Indeed, this entire discussion
would be moot if the possibility of having virtual friends
simply allowed us to have more friends than before. Thus,
it is the replacement of actual for virtual that lies at the
heart of the problem. I will not spend much time on this
presupposition, but I just want to point out that it is far
from unproblematic.
From an empirical point of view, there have been
numerous studies suggesting that virtual friendships do not
replace actual ones in any significant manner. A recent
report on usage of screen-based technologies (TV, com-
puters, portable devices, and so forth) concluded that
although there are big differences between age groups
when it comes to what type of screen-based activities we
spend our time on, ‘‘total screen time was strikingly sim-
ilar’’ (Council for Research Excellence 2009, p. 50). This
suggests that the concern many parents have that children
nowadays increasingly spend their time in front of a
computer screen is exaggerated; that time spent in front of
the computer is more likely to replace time spent in front of
the TV, rather than time spent with actual friends.Another
much-discussed study had a similar conclusion, but also
provided evidence that (and this is what caught the media
headlines): ‘‘the more time people spend using the Internet,
the more they lose contact with their social environment’’
(Nie and Erbring 2002, p. 275). This conclusion should be
taken with a grain of salt, however, since the study says
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nothing about whether the reduction in sociality was mar-
ginal or dramatic. The results are also inconsistent with
most other surveys on the topic, including Hampton et al.
(2009):
The extent of social isolation has hardly changed
since 1985… internet activities have little or a posi-
tive relationship to local activity… [and] people’s use
of the mobile phone and the internet is associated
with larger and more diverse discussion networks.
And, when we examine people’s full personal net-
work—their strong and weak ties—Internet use in
general [is] associated with more diverse social net-
works’’ (Hampton et al. 2009, pp. 4–5).
Citing numerous other studies, Wendy Griswold and
Nathan Wright also conclude that ‘‘research exploring how
the internet fits into pre-existing activities generally con-
clude that… the internet complements and supports offline
practices rather than displacing, undermining, or compet-
ing with them’’ (Griswold and Wright 2004, p. 206). This is
also explicitly noted by Cocking and Matthews who point
out that ‘‘whether or not one’s Net ‘friendships’ do replace
one’s non-virtual friendships is quite dependent on one’s
particular circumstances’’ (Cocking and Matthews 2000,
p. 224). To be fair, there are also many studies that reach
the opposite conclusion, but this only shows that this is an
immensely complex question that is inherently context-
sensitive and different for each individual—and certainly
not something that can be presupposed a priori.
Despite the inconclusive empirical research, the relation
between virtual and actual often seems to be chosen,
intentionally or not, with a certain conclusion in mind. That
is, engaging in virtual activities has been criticized on
grounds of its replacement of the actual thing when the
actual thing is considered to be good, but it has also been
criticized on the grounds of its encouragement of the actual
thing when the actual thing is considered to be bad (cf.
Table 1).
Criticism of virtual activities presupposes either that the
virtual replaces something good, or encourages something
bad. However, the opposite line of reasoning is far from
improbable—at least not a priori. If it is the case that
engaging in virtual acts of violence can encourage actual
acts of violence, why is it not the case that engaging in
virtual communities encourages engagement in actual
communities? Or, vice versa, if it is the case that engaging
in virtual communities replaces engagement in actual
communities, why is it not the case that engaging in virtual
acts of violence replaces engagement in actual acts of
violence? One way in which these relations may be
inverted comes from experiencing virtual surrogates of
something that is bad, and then appreciating how bad they
really are. For instance, cases of virtual rape (Dibbell 2007)
and other virtual crimes can in some cases make people
come to realize that the horror of such crimes go far beyond
physical violation alone—thereby coming to appreciate to
an even higher degree how gruesome these actual crimes
may be (Søraker 2010a). Closely related, we may experi-
ence virtual surrogates of what we believe is good in the
actual world and come to the conclusion that it might not
be worth pursuing after all—for instance fame and beauty.
Again, these are difficult empirical and inherently context-
dependent questions, and it is unlikely that one kind of
relation holds for all cases, so we cannot simply assume
that certain experiences will replace or encourage their
actual counterparts.6
If, for the sake of this discussion, we do presuppose that
virtual friends tend to replace actual ones, then the crucial
question becomes whether virtual friendships really are
inferior to actual ones. There are many ways in which to
address this question, but my main approach will draw on
the so-called principle of formal equality.7 The principle of
formal equality states that a difference in treatment or
value between two kinds of entities can only be justified on
the basis of a relevant and significant difference between
the two. For instance, many issues in animal ethics can be
approached by first discussing the theoretical differences
between humans and other animals (e.g. that some animals
have significantly less developed Central Nervous System)
and subsequently discuss to what degree these differences
are relevant to their value (e.g. that the less developed CNS
indicates little or no ability to experience pain). More
generally, for something to be of more or less value than
something else, the two must (1) be significantly different
in one way or another, and (2) we must be able to justify
why this difference entails a difference in value. Further-
more, to avoid question begging, this difference should be
grounded in empirical and/or theoretical properties that are
open to debate. In the remainder of this paper, I will outline
what I find to be some of the most important differences
between virtual and actual friendships, and discuss to what
degree these differences justify a difference in value. I will
do so with an eye to both empirical research and philo-
sophical analysis, carefully weighing the benefits and
shortcomings that virtual friendships may have. It is not my
intention to arrive at a firm conclusion—I believe the
6 To complicate matters further, whether or not virtual activities
replace or encourage real activities ultimately rests on whether we
presuppose an emotivist or rationalist account of the impact of virtual
experiences—that is, whether virtual experiences (primarily) affect
our deliberation process or our emotional dispositions. I have argued
elsewhere (Søraker 2010a) that we ought to take rationalist accounts
more seriously.
7 The principle is usually attributed to Aristotle (Nicomachian Ethics,
V.3. 1131a10-b15; Politics, III.9.1280 a8-15, III. 12. 1282b18-23; cf.
Gosepath (2008)]. See also Søraker (2007) and Wetlesen (1999).
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matter of well-being is far too contingent upon individual
life conditions for that to be possible—but my hope is that
these considerations will be of use when we try to clarify
the role we want virtual friends to have in our lives, and in
the lives of those we care for.
The relative value of actual and virtual friendships
It is initially difficult to compare actual and virtual
friendship unless we have a more concrete definition of
what it is that constitutes a genuine friendship. Do virtual
worlds offer us easier access to friends, hence improving
our well-being, or do they only offer us inferior forms of
friendship that replace genuine ones, hence reducing our
well-being? As mentioned above, the principle of formal
equality requires us to be precise about what it is that
constitutes genuine friendship, and then discuss whether
these requirements are satisfied by both actual and virtual
friends. In what follows, I will discuss a number of features
regarded as essential to friendship and their realizability in
virtual worlds, starting with Dean Cocking and Steve
Matthews’ (2000) aforementioned paper on the unreality
(or illusion) of close friendships in virtual worlds (or, text-
based communication in general).
Cocking and Matthews roughly follow the principle of
formal equality by first outlining the theoretical differences
between actual and virtual friendships, and then discuss
how this difference is relevant to their difference in value.
In a nutshell, Cocking and Matthews claim that virtual
friendships currently do not allow for non-voluntary self-
disclosure (theoretically significant difference) and that
genuine friendships can only be established on the basis of
non-voluntary self-disclosure (hence relevant). Further-
more, ‘‘the range of technologically based structural con-
straints inherent in Net communication… increase my
capacity to present to others, through the presentation of
my thoughts and feelings, a carefully constructed self, one
that is able, for example, to concoct much more careful and
thought-out responses to questions than I am able to in the
non-virtual case’’ (Cocking and Matthews 2000,
p. 228).The problem with virtual friendship, in other words,
is that they are based on our ability to carefully control how
we appear to the other, leading to a ‘‘friendship’’ that is
based on an idealized version of myself rather than who I
really am. Genuine friendships are created and
strengthened by the numerous involuntary cues we give off
about aspects of ourselves that we would typically not
disclose voluntarily—aspects of ourselves that we volun-
tarily choose to hide or distort in online communication.
According to this account, the only way to genuinely know
someone is to spend considerable amounts of time in their
physical presence, because physical proximity allows your
friend to see who you really are, to a much higher degree
than in virtual worlds. This approach to investigating the
value of virtual friendships, and CMC is often referred to as
the ‘‘cues filtered-out’’ approach (cf. Joinson 2003,
pp. 25–37). When applied to virtual friendship, this raises
three particularly important questions. First, to what degree
can virtual worlds allow for non-voluntary self-disclosure?
Second, how important is non-voluntary self-disclosure to
friendship? Third, are there features of virtual worlds that
can compensate for a lack (in degree) of non-voluntary
self-disclosure? I will discuss these in order.
Cocking and Matthews point out that they are primarily
referring to ‘‘text-based communication common to email
and chat room style forums’’ (Cocking and Matthews 2000,
p. 223 [n1]). However, their main objection to such com-
munication is that it does not provide behavioural cues of
the sort we observe in the actual world, thus it could be
argued that the problems they point out apply to any kind
of disembodied communication. There are, however, rea-
sons to doubt the applicability to virtual worlds. First,
virtual worlds do not allow for complete control over how
we appear to others. As anyone who has communicated
through virtual worlds will attest to, there is a lot of reading
between the lines and interpretation going on. Users also
infer information about their communication partner from
cues such as delayed response, (changes in) frequency or
time of day someone visits the virtual world, as well as
verbal mannerisms8 and spontaneous outbursts. In a study
by Patricia Wallace, it was also found that there is a large
number of clues that we (consciously or not) pick up from
textual communication, in particular with regard to truth-
fulness. Even without ‘‘the benefit of visual or auditory
Table 1 Virtual as replacement or encouragement of good and bad
Actual X is good Actual X is bad
Virtual X replaces actual X Virtual friendships replace actual friendships Virtual acts of violence replace actual acts of violence
Virtual X encourages actual X Virtual friendships encourage actual friendships Virtual acts of violence encourage actual acts of violence
8 Perhaps the most common ‘‘sociolect’’ in virtual worlds is
leetspeak, which uses various combinations of ASCII characters as
replacements of traditional spellings, coupled with numerous in-jokes
and references to Internet memes and catchphrases. This effectively
signifies belonging to certain groups, as well as the extent to which
the user is familiar with Internet technology and culture—in addition
to any connotations we may have of this group of people.
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cues [there] was a tendency for truthful subjects to use
words… somewhat more likely to be complete, direct, rel-
evant, clear, and personalized’’ (Wallace 1999, pp. 52–53)—
and we tend to pick up on such cues even without being
explicitly aware of them.
Still, Cocking and Matthews are probably right that this
is not sufficient for the level of self-disclosure they regard
as constitutive of genuine friendship, but there are reasons
to believe that this might change in the future. There are
already technologies that allow for mediation of facial
expressions and other behavioural cues in virtual worlds,
such as mapping facial gestures and body movements
detected by the webcam and map them onto the face of the
avatar. Indeed, this is one of the core activities in the open
source effort to use the Microsoft Kinect technology in new
and innovative ways.9 Thus, even if the criticism applies to
current virtual worlds, there is reason to expect that near
future virtual worlds will filter out fewer cues, hence pos-
sibly allow for some degree of non-voluntary self-disclo-
sure as well. It should be noted, however, that there will
still be a significant gap between a person’s actual gestures
and those projected onto the avatar, a gap that might still
lead to uncertainties about how genuine the mediated facial
expressions and body gestures are.
More to the philosophical argument, it is important to
note that Cocking and Matthews see self-disclosure as the
grounds for genuine friendship, and they regard non-vol-
untary self-disclosure as revealing more of our true nature.
Even if we agree with the former, as most accounts of
friendship would, there are reasons to disagree with the
latter. Could virtual worlds afford other means of self-
disclosure that may be as revealing as non-voluntary self-
disclosure in physical proximity? Adam Briggle argues that
the lack of non-voluntary cues in virtual worlds may
actually be an advantage when it comes to self-disclosure.
This is not a critique of the criterion as a condition for
friendship, but rather an observation to the effect that we
may be less likely to disclose ourselves in the actual world.
In a sense, Cocking and Matthews may be right that we
have more non-voluntary disclosure in the actual world, but
one of the reasons we need to resort to such cues is that we
often ‘‘wear masks, play roles, and fit molds’’ (Briggle
2008, p. 75). This point is also in line with Erving Goff-
man’s influential sociological analysis of the performances
we put on in order to guide and control how we are per-
ceived by others (Goffman 1959). Briggle also points back
to a rich tradition of philosophers who lament physical
presence as an obstacle to real friendship. In the words of
Ralph Waldo Emerson: ‘‘to my friend I write a letter and
from him I receive a letter… In these warm lines the heart
will trust itself, as it will not to the tongue’’ (Emerson 1991,
p. 230).
That we actually do disclose more of ourselves online is
also in line with empirical research. For instance, in Nick
Yee’s (2006) comprehensive survey of 30,000 virtual
world users, approximately 30 % reported having told
personal issues or secrets to their virtual friends that they
have never told their real-life friends. A study by Bargh
et al. also found ‘‘that people randomly assigned to interact
over the Internet (vs. face to face) were better able to
express their true-self qualities to their partners’’ (Bargh
et al. 2002, p. 33).10 Thus, lack of non-voluntary self-dis-
closure can partly be compensated by a lower threshold for
voluntary self-disclosure. This is complicated further if we
ask whether voluntary and non-voluntary self-disclosure,
even if equally disclosive, may lead to radically different
types of knowledge about one’s friend. This also shows
that the aforementioned principle of formal equality,
strictly speaking, only sets necessary conditions. If there is
a theoretically significant difference between the actual and
virtual world, and this difference is relevant to a difference
in value, then there may still be other factors that com-
pensate for the difference. From a purely philosophical
standpoint, then, it is difficult to conclude conclusively that
virtual friendships are inferior, since there are two theo-
retically significant differences—one positive and one
negative. But there are also a number of other positive and
negative theoretical differences that add to this complexity.
If we break the somewhat abstract notion of friendship
into constitutive elements, one clear indication of the value
of friendships comes from the value of having someone to
share with. This is related to self-disclosure, but rather than
being a condition for friendship, research indicates that one
of the most significant determinants of well-being lies in
the ability to share one’s positive and negative experiences
with others (Gable et al. 2004). Sharing positive experi-
ences has been shown to increase positive emotions, and
sharing negative experiences decreases negative emotions.
Whether this is an inherent or instrumental value of
friendship depends on whether we define friendships as
necessarily consisting of sharing. Regardless, such sharing
does not seem to require non-voluntary self-disclosure; we
can share positive and negative experiences both volun-
tarily and non-voluntarily. If it is the case that we have a
lower threshold for sharing through computer-mediation
communication, as discussed above, then virtual friend-
ships might indeed be seen as superior when it comes to
their prudential value: their ability to increase subjective
9 See e.g. www.kinecthacks.net for an overview of these projects.
The journal Computer Animation and Virtual Worlds is also filled
with similar projects (see in particular Volume 22, Issue 2–3).
10 See also Joinson (2003, pp. 130-133) for an overview of other
studies on self-disclosure through computer-mediated communica-
tion, most of which come to the same conclusion.
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well-being. At the very least, this is another valuable aspect
of friendship where there does not seem to be any basis for
judging virtual friendships as inferior to actual ones.11
Another aspect of friendship that is likely to contribute
to well-being lies in increased opportunities for pleasurable
experiences (again, this can be seen as instrumental or
intrinsic to friendship). As Cocking and Matthews also
point out, we will often ‘‘be moved to share the kind of
experience with a friend we otherwise would (probably)
never ourselves have chosen without invitation, not
because we feel obligated, or in some way pulled against a
natural urge to avoid doing it, but because this is something
the friend has chosen to do’’ (Cocking and Matthews 2000,
p. 226). Having a social network plausibly makes it easier
to engage in—and discover—pleasurable experiences of
various sorts. I have argued elsewhere (Sørake 2010b,
pp. 216–237) that one of the problems with virtual worlds
is that they give rise to fewer potentially valuable experi-
ences. This might sound counter-intuitive given the
impression of virtual worlds as the kinds of places where
only imagination sets the limits for what you can do.
However, it is a simple consequence of having all those
experiences restricted to at most two senses—sight and
sound. The numerous valuable experiences that are
grounded in smell, taste and touch—as well as composite
experiences requiring one or more of these—cannot pres-
ently be recreated in virtual worlds. As long as this is the
case, virtual friendships will bring about a smaller range of
pleasurable experiences than having actual friends. In light
of these considerations, actual friendships can be seen as
superior to virtual ones because an essential aspect of
friendship is that they bring with them a number of other
prudentially valuable experiences—and fewer of them in
virtual worlds. This is also illustrated by love relationships,
where the love itself is not necessarily less conducive to
well-being, but actual love brings with it physical intimacy
and many more shared activities, which is clearly some-
thing many people regard as essential to a good life.
There are also other differences that could affect the
value of virtual friendships. Briggle (2008) points to the
observation that modern living is carried out at such a
frantic pace that there is less and less time for the kinds of
deliberation and self-disclosure (voluntary or not) that
requires time and patience. Although this is probably a
more general problem with our culture at large, Briggle
finds that it is clearly at work when we are ‘‘squeezing in
e-mail or instant message exchanges while multi-tasking
on one’s PC’’ (Briggle 2008, p. 78). Briggle’s complaint
seems plausible enough, and there is every reason to doubt
that genuine friendships could emerge in such a manner.
However, this further illustrates why virtual worlds are
radically different from many other types of virtuality,
including discussion forums, chat rooms and social net-
working sites. Virtual worlds are typically not a multi-
tasking phenomenon. Since virtual worlds demand signif-
icant amounts of processing power and bandwidth, there is
little reason to be idle in a virtual world while multitasking.
Indeed, leaving your avatar idle is an invitation to be
robbed or killed in many virtual worlds.12 The ‘single-
tasking’ nature of most virtual worlds is also evidenced by
usage statistics, which clearly show that virtual world users
typically spend a significant time being active in the virtual
world once they are logged in. For instance, in Second Life,
users spend an average of 100 min in-world per visit—
significantly more than social networking sites.13 All of
this indicates that virtual worlds are less vulnerable to
Briggle’s criticism and much more conducive to the crea-
tion of friendship than other instances of CMC.
Trust is another issue that is closely related to the value
of friendship, whether we see it as something intrinsically
valuable or as something necessary for genuine friendship.
Trust in virtual worlds is usually more hard earned than
trust in actual life. In actual life, we tend to trust people by
default—at least when finding ourselves in relatively
familiar and/or peaceful surroundings (cf. Løgstrup 1997;
Weckert 2005). In virtual worlds, on the other hand, we
usually default to distrust—or, at least, to caution. That is,
most users do not trust others unless having spent consid-
erable amounts of time with them. We can describe this as
not trusting anonymous people in virtual worlds, but as we
spend significant amounts of time together, as emphasized
by Parks and Floyd (1996), they become pseudonymous
instead. This is important because we do not simply trust
(full stop); we trust someone or something. Even if we may
11 Another interesting question in this regard, which unfortunately
lies beyond the scope of this paper, is whether there are significant
differences between men and women’s conversational styles that may
affect the relation between communication in virtual worlds and
forming/maintaining virtual relationships. For instance, Deborah
Tannen (2001) has argued that women use communication as the
glue that holds relationships together (‘rapport-talk’), whereas men
tend to maintain relationships through activities and tend to use
communication more as a contest and for information (‘report-talk’).
12 For a while, in Second Life, users would be paid to have their
avatars simply sit in a chair (in order to attract crowds to an
establishment), which led to a host of idle avatars. However, these
chairs would often be placed in casinos, so that the users would be
tempted to immediately return the money they earned by losing it
back to the casino owner. Thus, ever since Linden Lab banned
gambling in Second Life, the existence of idle avatars has dropped
dramatically.
13 Cf. http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/22_09_09. Average
time spent in Second Life per week amounts to 760 min, compared to
653 for World of Warcraft (http://nwn.blogs.com/nwn/2009/05/
nielsen-correction.html). It should be noted that the average hours
are still inflated somewhat by passive bots (cf. http://
forums.secondlife.com/showthread.php?p=2288000).
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not know their actual identity, through our interactions we
start seeing consistent personality traits and behaviour,
which gives us a more or less stable point of reference to
which trust (or mistrust) can be attached. This relates to the
lack of embodiment, since we have become accustomed to
regard trustworthiness as a property of particular, embod-
ied beings—and we adjust our degree of trust based on
their bodily behaviour and on their bodily appearance
(regrettably, in many cases). An avatar is, when first
encountered, a less stable ‘point of reference’, because it
initially reveals very little about the person behind. Con-
sequently, ‘‘we have more difficulty (sometimes to the
point of futility) of reasonably assessing the potential harm
and good will of others’’ (Friedman et al. 2000, p. 40).
Thus, in order to trust someone in virtual worlds, we need
to spend comparably more time with them than in the
actual world.14 This is certainly a relevant difference
between actual and virtual friendship, but it is a difference
that can be overcome through time—both in terms of the
time we spend with other individuals and the time we
spend in virtual worlds in general.
Even if virtual worlds do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of trusting others, they do tend to have a
reduced ‘‘climate of trust’’ (cf. Baier 1986, pp. 245–246).
On this basis, it seems safe to conclude that virtual worlds
are inferior when it comes to trust. For example, purely
virtual friendships will often be less confident simply
because everything you know about the person comes
through CMC. In actual life, people can acquire a level of
trust, or confidence, in which they have no doubt whatso-
ever whether the love is real or not. In a purely virtual
friendship (i.e. one where there has been no physical
meeting), it is hard to imagine a similar level of trust-based
confidence. All of this may change if virtual worlds
become a more natural part of our life where the novelty of
it all no longer engenders a climate of mistrust, but this will
probably require a paradigm shift of the sort that can only
happen as the older generation dies out (cf. Kuhn 1996,
p. 90) and gives place to what Floridi refers to as ‘inforgs’:
‘‘As digital immigrants like us are replaced by digital
natives like our children, the latter will come to appreciate
that there is no ontological difference between infosphere
and Umwelt’’ (Floridi 2007, p. 63).
Finally, there is one important and neglected aspect of
the relation between well-being and friendship that has not
(to my knowledge) been discussed in the context of CMC.
In a comprehensive, 20-year longitudinal study of happi-
ness in a large social network, Fowler and Christakis
(2008) came to the conclusion that people who are
surrounded by many happy people, in particular those who
are central in the network, had a significantly higher degree
of well-being. The most surprising aspect of this research,
at least for our purpose, was that the most reliable indicator
of spread of happiness was physical proximity. On the
basis of their own research, and that of others, the authors
even go so far as to state that ‘‘close physical proximity or
coresidence is indeed necessary for emotional states to
spread’’ (Fowler and Christakis 2008). This conclusion also
has support from evolutionary psychology, according to
which contagious expressions of happiness tend to enhance
social bonds—which in turn is an evolutionary
advantage.15
If this research is correct, then this may be a very
important and hitherto overlooked inferiority of virtual
worlds. Because of the lack of physical proximity and
physical cues that signal happiness, virtual worlds are less
apt to foster dynamic spread of happiness. That said, if we
get a better understanding of the neurological and percep-
tual mechanisms that allow for spread of happiness and
other emotional states, it may be possible to instantiate
these in virtual worlds as well—and use virtual worlds as a
vehicle for the spread of happiness.
Conclusion
It may seem evasive not to draw a firm, normative con-
clusion regarding the value of virtual friendship, but this is
a natural consequence of evaluating their prudential
value—their value for someone. From this perspective, the
conclusion must necessarily be different for different
individuals. This does not mean that we have to resort to
pure relativism, however. By evaluating the relative pru-
dential value of virtual and actual relationships, we provide
considerations that individuals should take into account
when choosing the role virtual friendships ought to play in
their own life, or in the life of their loved ones.
Among the most important considerations discussed
above, we have seen that there are numerous differences
between actual and virtual friendships, many of which
determine their relative prudential value, but some of those
differences partly compensate for each other. One way in
which virtual worlds differ from actual worlds lies in the
lack of (or reduced) non-voluntary self-disclosure, and both
philosophical and empirical work shows that this is an
important component to genuine friendship. However, it
does not seem to be a necessary condition for friendship.
14 On some occasions, this can be seen as a good thing, in particular
with regard to some people’s lack of trust in people from a particular
cultural background, social class or similar.
15 See Grinde (2002) for a comprehensive discussion of the relevance
of evolutionary psychology for well-being studies. The emphasis on
physically living together is also an important theme in Aristotle,
perhaps most clearly seen in Politics, book III.
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The lack of non-voluntary self-disclosure can be (partly)
compensated by increased voluntary self-disclosure, and
virtual worlds allow many people to more easily express
themselves due to pseudonymity. Thus, if self-disclosure
forms part of the essence of friendship, as most accounts of
friendship seem to agree on, and the difference between
non-voluntary and voluntary disclosure does not amount to
a difference in value, then virtual friendship itself is not
necessarily inferior. However, friendships and communi-
ties also tend to come with a host of other aspects that tend
to contribute to well-being—and there will often be fewer
experiences available in a virtual world. In particular,
virtual worlds have fewer options for shared experiences
and pleasures, and no opportunity for physical intimacy.
Thus virtual friendships, even if not strongly inferior
themselves, can give rise to fewer opportunities to increase
well-being. Still, we need to remember that we cannot draw
conclusions that apply to everyone. Not everyone has the
opportunity to easily meet new people or join communities,
or to engage in the large range of activities and/or pleasures
offered by actual friendships. If it is correct that ‘‘high
happiness… does not appear to occur without [social
relationships]’’ (Diener and Seligman 2002, p. 83), then
virtual friendships will for some people be the only viable
means to experience such happiness. One aspect that even
the critics seem to agree on is that less value does not
necessarily mean no value, and whether or not this is the
case in one’s individual circumstance will require a
deliberation of the relative differences between actual and
virtual friends, and whether or not those differences are
relevant for you.
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